



Nouvelles luttes autour du genre en Egypte depuis
2011
Civic participation and gender institutional legacy
since January 25, 2011








CEDEJ - Centre d’études et de documentation économiques juridiques et sociales
Printed version
Date of publication: 10 November 2015





Marta Agosti, « Civic participation and gender institutional legacy since January 25, 2011 », Égypte/
Monde arabe [Online], Troisième série, New gender-related Struggles in Egypt since 2011, Online since
10 November 2017, connection on 07 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ema/3517  ;
DOI : 10.4000/ema.3517 
© Tous droits réservés
55
MARTA AGOSTI
CIVIC PARTICIPATION  
AND GENDER INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY  
SINCE JANUARY 25, 2011 
ABSTRACT
Civic engagement has become a threat to the current state of affairs since Egypt’s 2014 presidential elections. The blooming of motivated and active 
organisations, informal groups and social entrepreneurs had deinitely not been 
foreseen in the Mubarak era, and is still rarely accounted for in current political 
analysis. The daily ordinary practice of mundane people, not always linked to 
consolidated NGOs, development organisations or state institutions, has given 
birth to a very organic non-movement that has proven its ability to deal with 
diversity (in the many possible combinations of class, religion, gender and age) 
for the betterment of their communities in successful ways. Youth participation 
and young women’s involvement has been important in challenging the pre-
vious nation-State narrative and in the genesis of this movement. Nonetheless, 
youth engagement and their potential have seriously been constrained by sta-
gnant old regime structures, dificulties in accessing funds, bureaucracy and 
heavy repression. All of these were elements manufactured and controlled by 
Mubarak’s regime, that have found continuity in the current State committed to 
restoring the status quo ante, prioritising security over rights, and not allowing 
civil engagement outside its strict paradigms. As such, the public sphere has 
been assimilated as the exclusive domain of the State/Government. 
This paper will address the particularities of this organic non-movement 
with regards to young women’s civic engagement in addition to the speciic 
constraints that derive from its interaction with gender politics, with a particu-
lar focus on conventional forms of advocacy by state institutions and 




Civic engagement of young people in Egypt is very weak in terms of participa-
tion in groups or organised activities and voluntary work. Their social networks 
are limited to few friends and family, and these networks decline as young 
people age. However, young people are aware of Egypt’s social problem and 
rated highly issues such as poverty reduction, economic growth, and health 
and education reform. Nonetheless, they do not invest time to learn more 
about the social and political issues from the available media. 1
SYPE’s inal report was distributed at the beginning of January 2011. 2 In 
the light of historical events that happened, rather than a weak and disen-
gaged approach to civic participation, this quote reveals the discomfort and 
rejection that young people felt toward the institutions that were supposed to 
represent them. A month later, these same young men and women were on 
the frontlines among those who shook the status quo in the country and who 
overthrew Mubarak, ending his thirty-year rule.
Different analyses have pointed out the structural, socio-economic and 
political problems that prompted the 2011 uprising. Neoliberal policies, 
structural adjustment plans, youth unemployment, corruption and nepotism 
are unquestionably deeply rooted in the genesis of this critical event. 3 
However, this analysis from the sky 4 has neglected the involvement of ‘ordi-
nary people’ as dynamic actors of change. As Bayat 5 explains, the nuances 
and manoeuvres of the ordinary people have often been forgotten by social 
movement theorists and by political science analysts. Usually portrayed as 
politically passive recipients, ordinary citizens have gained a place as a unit 
of analysis after the multiple popular uprisings – in Egypt but also in the 
whole region; this has made the signiicance of their daily activities very 
apparent. However, the articulation of these activities in movements that can 
potentially gain leverage had to confront pre-existing and stagnant state insti-
tutions that carried on with different power dynamics and narratives that 
ordinary citizens had to contest. 
This paper looks at the controversies that arise when ordinary citizens 
involved in peaceful civic engagement and activism during the uprising 
1. Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) 2010, p. 145.
2. The Population Council conducted the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) in 
collaboration with the Egyptian Cabinet, Information and Decision Support Centre. 
The Ford Foundation; the Canadian International Development Agency; UNFPA; 
UNICEF; the World Bank; the Embassy of the Netherlands; UNDP; UNIFEM; and the 
Swedish International Development Agency supported the survey. 
3. See Das, Critical Events. Veena Das deines a critical event as “an event par excel-
lence because it instituted a new modality of historical action which was not inscribed 
in the inventory of that situation” (p. 5).
4. See Singerman 2011, p. 11. Singerman points out how traditional analyses of 
neoliberal policies that mainly focus on power structures, tend to neglect individuals’ 
relational forces as a successful form of resistance.
5. Bayat 2010.
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intersect with social institutions in the speciic domain of the women’s move-
ment(s). This aims at exploring the articulation of everyday feminism 6 to argue 
the importance of organic non-movements investing in social change. Civic 
engagement as latest developments have demonstrated, has become a great 
area of concern for the regime’s plans of restoration. As such, it deserves a 
6. Ibid., p. 33.














closer look. For this purpose, the paper addresses these questions for the 
period between 2011 and 2014. 7 
THE 8TH OF MARCH: INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S DAY
Women’s participation in the uprising is undeniable; 8 their capacity to react 
and organise was demonstrated during the 10.000 women’s march against 
military violence 9 in response to the brutal episode known as the Blue Bra 10 in 
the non-Arab media. Yet the events that took place during the celebrations of 
International Women’s Day in 2011 exempliied many of the historical con-
troversies that characterised the women’s movement(s) in Mubarak’s time. At 
the peak of civic and peaceful mobilisations, the irst time International 
Women’s Day was celebrated, free of old regime tactics and manoeuvres, it 
was a iasco. Based on my own observation, among around 200 participants 
in Tahrir Square, there were young women and men familiar with NGO work, 
some informal initiatives, well-known igures from the women’s movement, 
some UN oficials, a few National Council for Women oficials, a few journal-
ists. In addition, for the irst time since the beginning of the uprising, a 
noticeable amount of Western women were also present and could be easily 
spotted among the few people attending the celebrations. 
According to different participants, preparation for the celebrations was 
rushed, which could have been merely a consequence of the turbulent days 
that preceded, which did not leave much scope for organisation. However, the 
usual display of slogans and petitions, announcement of the meeting point, 
and the Facebook event did not gather popular support; neither did they meet 
with spontaneous adherence at a moment when it seemed easy to ind. As 
Sally Zohney, a young woman activist, explained: “a task force prepared for 
the International Women’s day, we were alongside other groups, planning for 
this, very informal… it was very poorly organised… it went very wrong, people 
got beaten and chased.” 11 As the Square at that time was always full, tension 
grew slowly, a group gathered next to where we were standing and the partic-
ipants were irst chased and later dispersed. As in a subsequent discussion of 
why it went wrong, Zohny pointed at controversies previously recorded and 
7. Efforts to regulate and punish civic engagement happening outside State control 
have dramatically increased since November 2014, date of the ultimatum for groups 
carrying out activities classiied by the government as falling under the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity’s mandate. Therefore, this paper differentiates between two phases, 
before and after the NGO ultimatum, and focuses on the irst one. 
8. See Hafez 2012, p. 38 and Winegar 2012.
9. See Shukrallah, “10,000 Egyptian Women March against Military Violence and 
Rule”, Ahram Online. 
10. RT, “Shocking Video: ‘Blue Bra’ Girl Brutally Beaten by Egypt Military.”
11. Interview.
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noted that the emergent informal groups were in the process of understanding, 
deconstructing, ighting and rebuilding themselves in different forms: 
There was no collective voice of what this day is for [...] We looked very upper 
class, a lot of people didn’t speak Arabic, a lot of foreigners, less Egyptians, for 
the mass streets this is something they didn’t want. Who knew of international 
days back then? Media was all over the place. […] It was accused of being 
something that was international, non-Egyptian. I remember very well, there was 
this woman in complete veil that they were carrying on their shoulders, and they 
were saying “this is an Egyptian woman, you are not Egyptian women.” They 
weren’t against the demands as much as they were against the image. 12
This episode illustrates many of the particular controversies in the articula-
tion of women’s rights demands. The mix of informal groups and old actors in 
the women’s movement(s) relected on the lack of coordination and leader-
ship, which was translated into a fragmented message. This fragmentation 
hampered mobilization of potential adherents, which was also reinforced by 
the idea that the women’s movement(s) was/were something alien to the pop-
ular masses. Also, the presence of noticeable foreigners on an international 
day evoked an uncomfortable relationship with what it is considered as the 
Other, and a way to denounce an event seen as not emanating from Egyptians’ 
own culture. This explained the need to reclaim the image that the media 
present at the scene would use to portray what a real ‘Egyptian woman’ is. As 
a result, although many demands made in Tahrir Square in January-February 
2011 involved issues that deeply affect women’s rights, and although men 
and women showed inclusive and egalitarian practices, principles and desires 
in the Square, many informal groups and secular 13 activists were reluctant to 
join demonstrations speciically for women’s rights. The popular blog The 
Arabist rightly asked: “Where were the opposition parties? Why wasn’t this 
publicised by the Kullena Khaled Said group?” 14 
These controversies have previously been highlighted by different aca-
demics in different forms. Badran 15 referred to gender activism as “invisible” 
due to the controversies, stereotypes and misconceptions generated by the 
adherence to feminism in the public arena. Ahmed also relates to this idea 
arguing that “questions of fusion and encoding have been critical for 
12. Ibid.
13. Regarding the term secular, I refer to Al-Ali (2000) who elaborates about the mul-
tiplicity of secular activists, who are in favour of separation between politics and 
religion, but can differ greatly on other issues.
14. For more details on this event, see: Lindsey, “International Women’s Day in Cairo”; 





women” 16 which has deep implications for women’s empowerment and the 
avenues available for their civic engagement until today. 
Since the strict anti-protest law was passed, 17 familiar forms of street activ-
ism such as strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins have almost disappeared. 
According to several sources, the number of persons detained from July 3, 
2013 to May 2014 exceeded 41,000; 18 women detainees are no exception 
and their numbers increase day by day. The cases of imprisoned human rights 
defenders Yara Sallam and Mahienour al-Massry among many others, 
were – and still are – of current concern for national and international human 
rights organisations. 19 The intense crackdown on political dissidents has pro-
voked a strategic – and perhaps only temporary – withdrawal from the streets. 
However, the original demands and principles of the uprising are still very 
relevant and present in citizens’ everyday lives, as none have been the subject 
of a serious and inclusive national debate. 
Political activism was – and still is – the most present and visual image of 
the uprising; however, the involvement of these same activists and many other 
citizens in community and social initiatives should not be underestimated. 
This involvement existed previously and kept growing in the years after the 
16. Ahmed 1992, p. 129.
17. See AhramOnline, “Full English Translation of Egypt’s New Protest Law”; Human 
Rights Watch, “Egypt: Draft Law Would Effectively Ban Protests.”
18. Middle East Monitor, May 2014.
19. See Elbadawi, “Yara Sallam”; Ali, “Run Mahienour Run”; Amnesty International, 
“Urgent Action--Activists Remanded in Jail, Trial in September.”
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uprising. For instance, Osman 20 pointed out how young people used to partic-
ipate in cultural activities as their main realm of expression and engagement. 
Moreover, by the end of 2008 the Ministry of Trade was processing more than 
2000 company registrations per week, in addition to the fact that by the mid-
2000s, for the irst time since decolonization, more Egyptians were employed 
in the private sector than the public sector. 21 Many of these newly created 
companies had a social and/or non-proit component. Since the NGO law 
implemented during Mubarak’s rule imposed heavy State controls and con-
straining bureaucratic processes on NGOs registered as such, many of these 
initiatives registered as private businesses, law irms, etc. or did not register at 
all. This reveals a great expansion of the ‘private’ domain (outside the hands 
of the State) to answer the expectations and aspirations of young entrepre-
neurs who come on board with a different ethical and moral landscape. This 
landscape is clearly aligned with the principles that young men and women 
reclaimed in Tahrir. 
This entrepreneurial boom, which includes social entrepreneurship, was 
– and still is – accompanied by a general inclination to avoid contact with the 
State and a strong sense of suffering, which has been repeatedly recorded. 22 
Furthermore, in the months following the uprising, young citizens and organi-
sations were very active in their attempts to collaborate with such initiatives to 
mobilise the increasing demand for volunteering. I can recall how just some 
months after the Uprising, one development partner I was working closely 
with at that time, gathered more than 200 small NGOs and community asso-
ciations in one meeting to discuss partner agreements and collaborations. 
Also, on the celebration of “Youth Day”, for example, which was organised by 
different UN agencies at al-Sawy Culture Wheel in 2012, more than 1.000 
volunteer applications were collected in one day.
On the other hand, civic engagement initiatives were also present and 
took part in the media revolution that was recruiting newcomers every sec-
ond. From March 2008 to July 2012, Egyptian Facebook users increased by 
372% (from 822,560 to 3,581,460). 23 Ranging from waste collection to fund-
raising and activities to reclaim public space through art exhibitions, cinema 
screenings, talks, lectures, book launches, concerts, sports activities, orga-
nized tours around the city, theatre, etc. were organised through Facebook, 
bypassing State clearance or registration. Since January 25, 2011 the number 
of cultural, sports, business and community participation initiatives that 
reclaim ownership over citizenship have involved as many citizens as the 
numbers that we saw in Tahrir Square. 
20. Osman 2012.
21. Ibid., p. 316.




Therefore, rather than announcing the end of the uprising, as some aca-
demics have done, 24 this article suggests that the battleield has shifted to the 
domain of social or community activism(s). This explains the government’s 
plans for screening, controlling, codifying and instrumentalising old and new 
social initiatives of different natures. 25 It also sheds light on the security appa-
ratus’ close monitoring and heavy repression of the receipt of foreign aid, 
registrations with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, as well as the activities of 
law irms, research centres, clinics, etc. and of course individuals since the 
ultimatum for NGOs to register was announced. 26 
FEMINISM AND THE ORDINARY CITIZEN
Feminists’ values, along with many other preoccupations, certainly form a 
part of ‘the emergence of a youth culture with intrinsic ties to an electronic 
and mediated world’ 27 that has citizenship as its battleield. It claims an alter-
native habitus that is intended to be diverse, and inclusive of all the 
marginalities found in the Square. What are the chances that this youth cul-
ture may be expanded and consolidated? 
Analysis of the engagement of young women with the uprising can be ana-
lysed from two different angles. The irst focuses on the involvement of young 
women as political and social activists for different causes, which may explain 
bloggers’ specialisations (for example, see Mona Seif and Nawara Negm on 
the issue of military trials) and the reluctance of many activists to be identiied 
with speciic initiatives that may carry political connotations in an attempt to 
remain organic and inclusive. As a senior UN staff person, who was looking 
for strategies to engage with them, put it: 
The Uprising gave room and ways for movements that are young, that were not 
represented, that were not by-products of the system, and that ask for things that 
were not elitist. They ask for very legitimate demands, that were a taboo to ask for 
in the past and that is mainly the set of rights in general. 28 
24. El-Ghobashy and Sabra, “Egypt After Raba’a: An Interview with Adam Sabra and 
Mona El Ghobashy”.
25. For more information on the content of the law and the reaction from CSO, see: 
Mada Masr, “Civil Society Law One More Link on Chain to Shackle Dissent in Egypt”; 
FIDH, “Egypt: New Measures to Further Obstruct NGOs’ Work”; EIPR, “Proposed 
Government Law Makes NGOs Subordinate to Security and Ministry Control.”
26. For more details see MadaMasr, “With Latest Crackdown, State Dissolves 380 
NGOs in Just 2 Months” and EIPR, “Proposed Government Law Makes NGOs 
Subordinate to Security and Ministry Control.”
27. Abbink 2004, p. 17.
28. Interview. Some interviews have been anonymized, upon request of the relevant 
interviewees.
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The second angle is that of speciic youth claims – including those of young 
women – with regard to “how youth are (in behaviours [and principles], out-
its, ways of speaking, and moving around within private and public spaces).” 29 
This depicts the collective existence of a non-movement in daily contestation 
and conquest of an alternative and marginal presence, and the intersection of 
this presence with political and social activism. Yet its intangible outcome is 
the reclaiming of values and principles of citizenship. In Bayat’s words, this 
account[s] for an everyday feminism that may rarely employ organisation and 
networking, mobilising strategies, street marches, picketing, strikes or disruption, 
and yet is able to extend [women’s] choices. 30 
My understanding is that while an everyday feminism is present at the gene-
sis of secular revolutionary demands, in both young women and men activists, 
the traditional political articulation of these demands has not gained 
29. Bayat 2010, p. 111.
30. Ibid., p. 87.














endorsement. This feminism has also been unable to establish solid networks 
and alliances with other movements, such as political parties, trade unions or 
human rights organisations, capable of mobilising support and inluencing the 
public. On the other hand, young social and political activists are leaning more 
towards organic and inclusive initiatives that not only share their political views 
but also claim a speciic habitus 31 underpinned by their condition of marginal-
ity, both within city dwellers and within youth. As a consequence, women’s 
rights activists may have felt divided between a long-established structure that 
does not represent them and an organic movement that could potentially dilute 
their particular claims. 32 Mariam Kirollos (human rights’ activist and co-founder 
of Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault) expressed this dilemma in an 
interview at the Global Uprising Conference:
I always believed and dreamt of a strong feminist movement in Egypt that ights 
everything that we are against; ights capitalism, patriarchy, racisms, nationalism, 
homophobia, the long list of things that we are against. The Egyptian revolution 
continues, and without women and the resistance I do not think the revolution 
will mean anything. And honestly what keeps me so positive are Egyptian 
women, basically, and how they are resisting so much because no one reco-
gnises how hard it is. Their very own presence in a demonstration is a form of 
resistance, they [the State] have been trying so hard to marginalise us and they 
know that if they stop them [women] from going to protests, next day they will 
stop them from walking on the streets, the next time they will stop them from 
working… we keep on resisting. 33
What I ind enlightening in this statement is the use of an inclusive we to 
address a long list of claims that include a different set of values within a fem-
inist movement. This goes beyond the traditional Egyptian claims of the 
“women’s movement” and directly challenges the constituency imposed by 
old state narrative. She is not addressing women’s participation in a 
nation-building capacity by asking for quotas, education, and any other ield 
in a vertical structure; she is addressing participation by presence and resis-
tance, which implies a horizontal integration that demands a very inclusive 
movement – pertaining to women as much as to men – capable of addressing 
all these questions. Therefore, what kind of a political structure could actually 
articulate these claims and values? 
31. Bourdieu 1977.
32. A third angle of analysis – that ought to be contemplated – has become very rele-
vant since the start of Sisi’s presidency: the emotional fatigue that can be experienced 
after several years of confrontation, loss, and exposure to violence. In my recent 
interviews, this has been expressed in the need to withdraw, relect on lived experi-
ences and mourn. 
33. Kirollos, “Fighting Sexual Assault in Egypt.”
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When the SYPE inferred that ‘only 4.9% of Egyptian young people are 
members of a group or organization – almost twice as many males (6.4%) as 
females (3.4%) are members’ 34 – as one way to measure civic participation, 
they were taking for granted that the current set of organisations and social 
institutions were inclusive of youth values. On the other hand, little attention 
was paid to questions pertaining to values and principles: “only 1.4% think 
that values deinitely exist in society [and] the wealthiest 40% also have the 
highest percentage who believe that social values are absent”. 35 Although the 
questions raised by the survey did produce data, in my view this data was the 
relection of youth’s alienation from social institutions, rather than lack of will 
or interest in civic engagement; it depicted a youth that had shifted and cre-
ated different spaces of participation. Implicitly, the youth were being 
analysed as ‘agencies in the process of being’, 36 so they themselves were the 
ones subject to change in order to integrate the social structures. SYPE’s anal-
ysis neglects their involvement as part and a consequence of the social and 
political constitution of a society. 37 The picture drawn by SYPE would have 
been quite different if they had taken issues pertaining to the political and 
social agency of youth into consideration, in phrasing their survey questions. 
Essentially, did young people believe that social institutions shared their val-
ues? And if not, where were they expressing those values? 
THE LEGACY OF THE POLITICS OF GENDER 
On the other hand, feminism, the traditional source of women’s movements, 
had been marginalised for a long time by State-controlled machinery that 
monopolises Egyptian women’s representation in the national and interna-
tional arena 38 and heavily impacts access to funding. The State-gender 
machinery, under the inluence of the First Lady, crystallised into two institu-
tions in the Mubarak era: the National Council for Women (NCW), founded 
in 2000 and the National Council for Motherhood and Childhood (NCCM), 
founded in 1988. 
However, this bizarre situation did lead to some good, yet controversial 
results. As had previously happened under Sadat – what became infamously 
known as ‘Jehan’s Laws’ – the speciic reforms carried out under ‘Suzanne’s 
Laws’ had also started to lead to a backlash 39 by the end of 2011. Additionally, 
during the ‘Jehan’ and ‘Suzanne’ periods, Egypt ratiied major international 
34. SYPE 2010, p. 134.
35. Ibid., p. 143.
36. Ennew 2002.
37. See Comaroff 2005.
38. Hatem 2011, p. 37.
39. See Dawood, “Backlash against ‘Suzanne Mubarak Laws’ Was Inevitable”; and 
Reem, “Controversy over ‘Suzanne’s Laws’.”
66
MARTA AGOSTI
treaties protecting women and children’s rights, although with serious reserva-
tions: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) in 1981 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
in 1990. After Mubarak’s departure, the Alliance of Women’s Organisations 40 
demanded the NCW be replaced with a democratic transparent body; this later 
became a demand for an independent body outside State control. 41 
In February 2012, Mervat al-Tallawy became Head of the National Council 
for Women. She was a former diplomat (1991-1997) and Minister of Social 
Affairs under Mubarak (1997-1999), and had sponsored Law 153 (1999) 
which, according to Human Rights Watch, was the law that initiated the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity’s micro-management of NGO operations. 42 With 
this manoeuvre the same gender machinery – embedded within a nation-build-
ing narrative – was renovated, continuing through Morsi’s presidency (from 30 
June 2012 to 3 July 2013), and regaining its previous position under the cur-
rent government. Historically, the irst efforts to articulate an independent 
feminist movement were initially hampered by Nasser. Even though he 
claimed to build “the State that inally granted women full political rights”, he 
“withdrew the freedom to organise politically”. 43 The feminist movement was 
then co-opted by Sadat and Mubarak, who imposed gender machinery that 
preserved State ownership of the women’s agenda. 
As a result, the dynamics of cohabitation between independent and State 
institutions have remained very complex. Recent developments pertaining to 
the issue of sexual harassment provide evidence of this. First, independent 
NGOs have been working on anti-sexual harassment campaigns since 2005. 44 
Many successful initiatives have taken off strongly since 2011, documenting 
harassment, mobilising citizens on the streets and on social media against it, in 
addition to assisting survivors of sexual assaults. This has led to an increase in 
open, public debates. A tipping point was reached during the celebrations for 
the inauguration of Egypt’s new President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi (June 7-8, 2014) 
when brutal episodes of sexual violence took place. Though numerous similar 
violent incidents had taken place in previous years, it was only when the media 
exposed blatant visual evidence of a case happening during the oficial cele-
brations, that State oficials, led by the President himself, reacted strongly for 
the irst time, making a point of visiting one of the victims. 45 A new law crimi-
nalizing sexual harassment was passed and implemented, and several 
perpetrators of assault were given life sentences. 46 In this process, independent 
NGOs made a coordinated statement condemning the assaults and announced 
40. OpenDemocracy, “Statement from the Coalition of Women’s NGO’s in Egypt.”
41. See Hatem 2011, p. 38.
42. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000.”
43. Badran, Feminism in Islam, p. 129.
44. Rizzo, Price and Meyer, 2009.
45. MadaMasr, “Sisi Visits Tahrir Square Mob Sexual Assault Victim in Hospital.”
46. AhramOnline, “Life Sentences for Sexual Assaults at El-Sisi Celebration.”
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a protest 47 on June 14 that had online support of 198,000, plus 25,900 ‘joining 
the event’ on Facebook (numbers that can only shed some light on people’s 
intention of participating, since the demonstration was only attended by a small 
number). When NCW announced its participation, most of the independent 
NGOs withdrew from the march and organised a press conference instead. 48 
The message from these independent groups was strong: ‘First verdict in cases 
of mob-sexual assault and gang rape in Tahrir Square is no end to the story; all 
previous crimes of sexual violence must be investigated’. 49 As Dr Magda Adly 
from the NGO al-Nadeem Centre explained during the press conference, 
attacks happen with the Ministry of Interior’s complete awareness and they 
never gave a statement addressing the issue, nor did the National Council for 
Women. 50 The press conference was clear on the State’s complicity in the inci-
dents of mob-sexual harassment, mob assaults and gang rape that had occurred 
during demonstrations in previous years. At the same time, all this revealed the 
polemics about collaborating with State bodies. As Mr. Mostafa Mahmoud, a 
lawyer working for the feminist NGO Nazra, put it: “If the State wants to care, 
it has clear mechanisms and legislative mechanisms [to do so].” 51 
The environment of fear generated by the new anti-protest law (passed in 
November 2013) 52 has played a signiicantly negative role in the dynamic 
between the State and activists, as permits are now required to organise advo-
cacy events, which can only be secured with the participation of a State 
institution, such as the NCW. Furthermore, activists who were operating in 
Tahrir Square with different purposes and who had been very consistent in 
raising evidence are now threatened. Still, the controversy of collaborating 
with the State is no less profound for some of the more consolidated NGOs 
that have long-standing collaborative relations with State institutions. As a 
women’s rights lawyer involved in the anti-sexual harassment campaign put it: 
“independent NGOs should keep putting pressure on government institu-
47. See the Facebook event: Walk Like An Egyptian Woman: نازلن لرفض كارثة اغتصاب نساء 
.مر ي الشوارع
48. See the Facebook event: مؤمر صحفي | العنف الجني ومواقف الدولة خال عر سنوات.
49. Nazra for Feminist Studies 2014. 
50. Nazra. Author’s own audio recording from June 15, 2014.
51. Ibid.
52. Kingsley, “Egypt’s Interim President Adly Mansour Signs ‘Anti-Protest Law’”; 
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tions, however we need to invest in this political momentum to offer the 
know-how”. Yet when I asked which institutions are working on the imple-
mentation and reinforcement of the law, the answer was: “nobody”, 53 
indicating a lack of institutional commitment. 
This example helps to clarify the dynamics of co-optation and rebranding 
of the efforts of civil society associations and initiatives, by State institutions, 
which reveals how much the latter’s desire to seek social justice is in doubt. 
The gains achieved over this period thanks to the efforts of a vast network of 
activists, putting their mental and physical health at risk to advocate for legis-
lation explicitly banning harassment and assault and for the prosecution of 
perpetrators, have simply been minimised. Instead, State institutions jumped 
in with their political propaganda when public opinion demanded action, but 
later abandoned the issue without achieving substantial results. This was high-
lighted at the independent NGOs’ press conference on June 15, 2014 where 
they stated that over 500 cases of sexual violence in the public sphere had 
been recorded and reported, 54 dating back to June 2012, yet the State had 
failed to react until June 2014.  
This historical intertwining of gender issues with ‘national machinery’ has 
provoked an uncomfortable cohabitation between State institutions and wom-
en’s rights activists. It is currently being reshufled, but the outlook now seems 
bleak, in view of the new NGO law the government is implementing. As my 
interview with a senior UN staff person conirmed: 
The 2013 Coup – and that’s my own understanding – has reinstated the deep 
State, including the government entities working on gender and the big NGOs 
monopolising gender issues that were operating during the Mubarak times and 
before. From 2010 to 2013, you have the movements talking about all kinds of 
rights. From 2013 to now you have the Mervat(s) Tallawy(s), the Hoda(s) Badran(s), 
the Egyptian Feminist Union, not only the NCW, but you have these big tycoons 
that are monopolizing the scene again. And the scene is now characterised not 
only by trends and issues discussed from a gender perspective but also as a gene-
rational issue. Those big names are not leaving room to new cattle [sic] to come 
on board. Their way of dealing with things is mono track and very elitist, the 
same that the Mubarak era was operating with no interest at all to engage in a 
dialogue (…) There is no dialogue, because the old guards of the civil society are 
53. Interview. Also, it is worthwhile to note here that the question of sexual harass-
ment and assault in Egypt in the public sphere, since incidents were irst documented 
in 2005 (the irst recorded incident was in the 1990s), demands a separate paper per 
se, since the dynamics involved touch upon multi-layered structures of power, gender 
relations and the State. The complex relationships between State institutions and 
independent activists is similar when we refer to other topics; however, due to the 
actuality and importance of sexual harassment and assault, I chose to briely show-
case these dynamics through this example. 
54. Nazra, “First Verdict in Cases of Mob-Sexual Assault and Gang Rape in Tahrir 
Square Is No End to the Story.”
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not speaking to the new generation of civil society. There is big resentment 
towards the movements that emerged from Tahrir Square. 55 
Some authors, such as Korany and El-Mahdi 56 go as far as stating that the 
women’s movement in Egypt was orphaned when the State assumed its lead-
ership, which in their view, may explain “why protesters have chosen to deny 
the gender dimension in which injustice occurs, framing women’s rights in 
apolitical terms”. 57 Badran 58 also argues that 
throughout the century, women have placed their feminism within the nationalist 
context and within the framework of Islam. Through the argument and action 
they have defended the nation against foreign occupation and economic, politi-
cal, and cultural imperialism. However, patriarchy has had the temerity to label 
feminism in Egypt as Western, ipso facto un-Islamic, to discredit feminism by 
undermining its national and cultural-cum-religious legitimacy. 59
As a result, State institutions accommodate their narrative under a light, 
friendly, Islamic discourse that proactively avoids public references to feminist 
values and principles. On the contrary, it was not rare to see explicit feminist 
jargon being used by young women activists participating in initiatives emerg-
ing from Tahrir Square.
I believe that as a consequence, feminism has been disconnected from the 
State-led women’s movement and become a feature in the activities of this 
wave of marginal young secular activists who want feminism’s principles to be 
lived, not enchained in institutions and laws. By doing so, they are directly 
challenging the constituency of State-led women’s movements (which includes 
its afiliated NGOs). Is there any reconciliation possible? Could this organic 
approach be sustained or will it require a political structure in order to prevail? 
ORGANIC MOVEMENT(S) AND “WOMEN’S RIGHTS” POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE: THE CONTROVERSIES
The historian Sorbera has put forward the four most common challenges that 
must be overcome for a real shift in gender politics to take place. The 
Egyptian women’s movement(s) will have to address the historical gap 
between women’s participation and institutional representation; the lack of 
an intersectional approach capable of mobilising and consolidating a 
55. Interview.






grassroots movement; the absence of a uniied leadership; and tensions in 
intergenerational communication. 60 
Though I agree these are real challenges and that addressing them could 
lead to an increased unity of the different women’s movement(s) in Egypt, I 
would argue that these elements need to be carried further to better under-
stand the movements’ complexities. First, the organic nature of this feminism 
is an intricate and indivisible value that accompanies other sets of values 
expressed in the emergence of this speciic youth culture that has gained visi-
bility with the 2011 uprising. In this sense, adhering to a political structure 
that does not combine all these values may undermine the political and social 
agency of their potential adherents. 
Secondly, it is important to acknowledge the complex structure and power 
relations within which the women’s movement(s) has to operate and the difi-
culties that institutions and individuals alike, face if they attempt to change 
this structure. The same UN oficial, when asked how they could support 
these new young movements, clearly explained the strong structure that backs 
the regime’s agenda: 
I’m engaging with movements through individuals, and through their own 
networks, because I cannot continue to work in a traditional way in a very untra-
ditional setting, by doing so I will would continue de facto to marginalise youth 
and marginalise movements if I insist on working with a registered NGO and 
through the NCW. 61 
Regarding the power relations, the oficial added: 
There is a big amount of bullying and the bullying is not only at the local level. 
They [the government] are very irm and very strong in what they want and they 
bully their way through. They have a very good lobbying mechanism inside the UN 
corridors in New York. For example, we have a monthly mechanism since 30th of 
June called the Inter Agency Task Force on Egypt. The Secretary General chairs it, 
they meet once a month, (…) [attended by] the Department of Political Affairs, the 
Secretariat and the members of the country agencies chaired by the Resident 
Coordinator in Egypt. Video conference. And this is where analyses are shared, 
Egypt right away managed to implant Egyptians representing every single agency in 
that mechanism (…) all of a sudden you have people sitting there, giving inputs 
that are in line with the government’s interpretation of things and preventing any 
other analysis that would come up. So if someone says anything that it is controver-
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This is a particularly important point, since National Councils and consol-
idated NGOs’ budgets for running programs are heavily dependent on 
international funding, so both independent and governmental institutions 
working on gender and youth issues compete for the same funds. However, 
State institutions manage to hamper independent organisations’ access to 
funds through strict regulation and power relations. Additionally, this dynamic 
of bullying does not foster a cooperative environment in which to articulate 
an intersectional approach. In my view, movements and initiatives that would 
like to cooperate together to develop an intersectional approach will not only 
require networking downward to grassroots organizations, and horizontally 
between movements, but also networking upward to conquer their legitimate 
space at the international level. In this regard, networking up will provoke a 
strong confrontation with the government as explained above, but the other 
two directions are not exempt of controversies either. 
First, as the manager of a well-established NGO which has worked in 
deprived areas for the past twenty years, explained to me, strong inancing 
and reporting regulations really hamper development programming, as there 
are a number of “layers” between donors and recipients of development aid, 
including State Security control. This, in his view, leads to a feeling of mistrust 
that hampers the achievement of tangible results. Also, State Security pres-
ence has strong consequences, since it forces government involvement at 
every level. 
We always work with local oficials from the ground, why? Because we know 
that we are in a very strict monitoring security system that means that if we are 
working […] where there are many members of the Muslim Brotherhood we 
have to be very clear, the vision of all the activities has to be very clear. This is 
why it is very important for us to have direct contacts with the oficials. You can-
not avoid doing that, even if -and we encountered a lot of that- people [oficials] 
are not very collaborative. Not very courageous people. 63
This exempliied the need for professionalization of these new movements 
to deal with all these layers of bureaucracy to access funds; this is very much 
at odds with their nature and organic foundation. At the same time, this raises 
questions about how to deal with security matters in deprived areas in which 
coordination with the State is required. 
Secondly, horizontal networking will mean reaching other movements, 
whose ideological position may be very challenging, as for instance conserva-
tive religious groups. How will this organic approach deal with such an 
emotional controversy that is loaded with its own history of mistrust, greatly 




compromising the organic soul of the movement and adhering to a uniied 
leadership seem to be a hard task. 
Finally, regarding Sorbera’s 64 last remark, the intergenerational communi-
cation challenge has many roots, but a very important one is that of the 
dissonant dissident voices – that happen to be young. These voices are chal-
lenging the constituency of national structures that operated under Mubarak 
and have now been reshufled, challenging their traditional sphere of inlu-
ence. Older generations in positions of power proactively undermine the 
category of ‘youth’ to dismiss the idea of a factual dialogue that includes 
young people in a co-shared responsibility framework. As an Army General 
brutally stated in 2012: 
we will discipline those kids of Tahrir… We thought we were protecting a revolu-
tion, but it turns out that we are protecting nothing but a bunch of non-virgin girls 
and homosexual kids. 65 
Moreover, a closer look at what constitutes ‘youth’ as a category may 
reveal some surprises, since it will rarely correspond to the strict statistical 
classiication by age (15 to 24 years old) often used by the State. This classii-
cation neglects the strong ties of young people with older generations 
non-aligned with the State or elders who, consequently, are also being 
silenced by the shadow of “youth” that is wrongly being labelled as ‘arrogant, 
disobedient and impolite’, 66 as the same women’s rights lawyer put it. Through 
my own research I have come across young women and men engaged in 
different activities who often seek advice from older generations, and who use 
the structures that they created in the past to support new activities. In this 
sense, these connections are giving continuity and visibility to generations of 
opposition activists, who may not always be in the Square but deinitively 
exist and have a deep footprint in the current oppositional wave. As an exa-
mple we can take the picture that Gigi Ibrahim took of Nawal al-Saadawi in 
another women’s march organised on April 20, 2012. Her writings have come 
to the frontline by the hand of her young readers merging both times in a 
single space and putting the discredited label of ‘youth’ very much in ques-
tion. As Bourdieu reminded us “classiication by age (but also sex and of 
course class…) always means imposing limits and producing an order to 
which each person must keep”. 67 
64. Sorbera 2014.
65. Abdel Latif in Bayat, p. 424.
66. Interview.
67. Bourdieu 1993, p. 94.
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CONCLUSION
The dynamics observed in Tahrir Square and during subsequent events could 
lead one to think that since women’s issues were strongly embedded in a 
political machinery, many activists perceived prioritising women’s rights as 
divisive. On the contrary, secular activists chose to build on their features as 
disenfranchised and unrepresented citizens, which combined the ideals of 
feminism and at the same time, generated inclusive dynamics. This inclusive 
approach also worked to attract other segments of society who were feeling/
being marginalised. In this sense, feminism became a feature of the mar-
ginal and was disentangled from its traditional niche; however, how 
feminism will be translated into practical terms by these new young move-
ments, remains unknown. 
At the same time this paper has argued that, in parallel to political activ-
ism, there is a strong burst of citizenship initiatives that are challenging 
traditional spheres of power linked to the State, with particular attention to 
the women’s rights State machinery and its links to development actors, since 
they are the main funders. These spheres of power are proactively tailoring 
regulations affecting the public sphere to marginalise and punish private ini-
tiatives through legal procedures, a discourse of stigmatisation and fear, and 
repression. However, this organic non-movement(s) has proven to be capable 
of combining the expectations of many groups, and as such, it/they repre-
sent(s) a threat to the restoration of the status quo. In this regard, the expansion 
of the youth culture results in the expansion of its political structure and 
potential leverage, since their paths cross in multiple areas. 
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